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 NOTE 
The Plight of the Tattletale: How the Eighth 
Circuit’s Relaxing of Rule 9(b) Means More 
Unpredictability for FCA Whistleblower 
Claims 
United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 F.3d 
914 (8th Cir. 2014). 
SUZANNE L. SPECKER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) was enacted during the Civil War for the 
purpose of combatting pervasive fraud by government contractors.1  The FCA 
prohibits any person from knowingly “caus[ing] to be presented” to the gov-
ernment false claims for payment or approval.2  To encourage insiders to 
report fraud and to improve the FCA’s enforcement, the FCA contains a qui 
tam provision, which permits private persons, known as “relators,” to bring 
civil actions on behalf of the United States and to claim a sizeable portion of 
the resulting award.3 
The FCA’s importance to the federal government cannot be overstated.4  
For fiscal year 2014, the Department of Justice reported a record $5.69 billion 
in settlements and judgments from civil fraud and false claims cases.5  
Meanwhile, the FCA continues to serve as the government’s primary mecha-
nism for combatting false claims for funds under government contracts, in-
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 1. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 2. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 3. See id. § 3730(b), (d). 
 4. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 5. Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion From False Claims Act Cas-
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cluding Medicare, defense contracts, federally-insured loans and mortgages, 
and veterans’ benefits.6 
Despite the FCA’s tremendous importance and the increasing number of 
claims brought under the FCA each year,7 the pleading standard required of a 
relator bringing suit under the FCA remains an unfortunate source of confu-
sion.  Federal appellate courts are sharply divided over whether a whistle-
blower complaint can survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) if it pleads a fraudulent scheme to submit false claims but fails 
to plead with particularity that false claims were actually presented to the 
government, known as “presentment.”8 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned 
Parenthood addresses this very issue.9  As this Note argues, the Thayer deci-
sion not only departs from the Eighth Circuit’s previous position within the 
circuit split, but it also further contributes to the confusing variance of nuanc-
es and interpretations that exist regarding how to apply Rule 9(b) to FCA 
claims.10  Because the Thayer decision arguably increases the muddled con-
fusion of Rule 9(b)’s application to FCA claims, it is imperative that the Su-
preme Court resolve the circuit split in the near future.  In Part II, this Note 
analyzes the facts and holding of Thayer.  Next, in Part III, this Note explores 
the legal background of the FCA and the development and current state of the 
circuit split surrounding Rule 9(b)’s application to FCA claims.  Then, Part 
IV examines the court’s rationale in Thayer.  Lastly, Part V more closely 
examines the circuit split, noting the complexity and divergence of the differ-
ent standards being applied within the circuits that are adopting what appears 
to be a uniform “relaxed” approach to Rule 9(b).  In addition, Part V argues 
that the Supreme Court should review these inconsistent approaches, and it 
assesses Thayer’s immediate implications for Missouri businesses that con-
tract with the government. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Defendant Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. (“Planned 
Parenthood”) is a non-profit corporation that provides reproductive healthcare 
services to patients, including patients who qualify for Title XIX Medicaid.11  
From 1991 to December 2008, Plaintiff Susan Thayer worked as the center 
manager of Planned Parenthood’s Storm Lake, Iowa clinic.12  Simultaneously 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  The number of qui tam suits filed annually has increased from approxi-
mately 300 suits per year between the years 2000 and 2008 to over 700 suites filed in 
the years 2013 and 2014.  Id. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 9. See United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 
F.3d 914, 915 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 10. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 11. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 915. 
 12. Id. 
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from 1993 to 1997, Thayer also worked as the center manager of Planned 
Parenthood’s LeMars, Iowa clinic.13 
In 2008, Planned Parenthood dismissed Thayer.14  Following her termi-
nation, she brought a qui tam action against Planned Parenthood in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa seeking to recover funds that 
Planned Parenthood had allegedly obtained in violation of both the federal 
FCA and the Iowa False Claims Act (“IFCA”).15  In her Complaint, Thayer 
alleged that all of Planned Parenthood’s clinics participated in four fraudulent 
schemes from early 2006 to December 2008, each of which involved submit-
ting false or fraudulent claims for Medicaid reimbursement to the United 
States and Iowa governments.16  These schemes consisted of Planned 
Parenthood: (1) billing Medicaid for birth control pills that were either pre-
scribed without examinations or were not received by Planned Parenthood 
patients; (2) billing Medicaid for abortion-related services in violation of 
federal law and instructing patients who had abortion-related medical compli-
cations to provide false information to other medical professionals, which 
caused those medical providers to unknowingly file Medicaid claims for 
abortion-related services; (3) billing Medicaid for the entire amount of medi-
cal services, even when those services had already been partially paid for by 
the patients; and (4) engaging in a process known as “upcoding” by billing 
Medicaid for more expensive services than were actually performed.17 
Planned Parenthood moved to dismiss the Complaint on three independ-
ent grounds.18  First, it argued that Thayer’s Complaint failed to satisfy Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which establishes a heightened pleading 
requirement for fraud cases.19  Rule 9(b) provides, “In alleging fraud or mis-
take, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake.”20  Relying on the pleading standard articulated by the Eighth 
Circuit in United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc.,21 Planned 
Parenthood contended that, to satisfy Rule 9(b), Thayer’s FCA Complaint 
was required to “plead such facts as the time, place, and content of the de-
fendant’s false representations . . . including when the acts occurred, who 
engaged in them, and what was obtained as a result.”22  Planned Parenthood 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Sue Thayer, Thayer: Planned Parenthood’s Big Lie, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 
31, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/31/planned-parenthoods-
big-lie/. 
 15. See United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 
Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00129-JAJ-CFB, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ThayerDismissalOrder.pdf. 
 16. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 915–16. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Thayer, slip op. at 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (emphasis added). 
 21. 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 22. Thayer, slip op. at 4. 
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argued that Thayer failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirement be-
cause she failed to identify even one specific instance in which Planned 
Parenthood submitted a false claim to the government, and instead, she mere-
ly alleged Planned Parenthood’s general “schemes” to submit false claims.23  
Second, Planned Parenthood argued that Thayer’s claims did not constitute 
FCA claims because they were only alleged regulatory violations.24  Third, it 
argued that Thayer’s Second Amended Complaint was improperly filed be-
cause it was not filed under seal.25 
In response to Planned Parenthood’s motion to dismiss, Thayer argued 
that her Complaint provided sufficient detail of Planned Parenthood’s alleged 
fraudulent activities to put the organization on notice of her claims and to 
allow it to adequately respond to those claims.26  In addition, Thayer con-
tended that her claims were properly brought under the FCA because they 
were allegations that Planned Parenthood violated Medicaid regulations.27  
Finally, Thayer argued that the sealing requirement did not apply to com-
plaint amendments.28 
Although the district court noted that Thayer’s allegations were detailed, 
the court emphasized that none of her allegations provided “a specific false 
claim that Planned Parenthood allegedly submitted to the government,” as 
required by Rule 9(b) and the Joshi pleading standard.29  As such, the district 
court granted Planned Parenthood’s motion to dismiss.30 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded for further proceedings, holding that some portions of Thayer’s 
Complaint were pled with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b).31  Spe-
cifically, the Eighth Circuit clarified the pleading standard for claims brought 
under the FCA by expressly adopting the pleading standard of several other 
circuits.32  In adopting this new pleading standard, the Eighth Circuit held 
that a relator may satisfy Rule 9(b) without pleading the circumstances sur-
rounding a specific instance of a false claim, but only if the relator pleads 
 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 7. 
 30. Id. at 9. 
 31. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 
F.3d 914, 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2014).  The Eighth Circuit found that the following alle-
gations were pled with sufficient particularity: Planned Parenthood filed claims in 
violation of the FCA for: (1) unnecessary quantities of birth control pills in violation 
of the FCA; (2) birth control pills prescribed without examinations or doctor’s orders; 
(3) abortion-related services; and (4) the entire cost of services that had already been 
paid, in part or in whole, by patients.  Id. 
 32. Id. at 918–19. 
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both “particular details of a scheme to submit false claims” and “reliable indi-
cia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.”33 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Thayer decision is best understood within the underlying context of 
the FCA.  Accordingly, this Part explores the creation of the FCA in 1863 
and its current relevance.  This Part concludes with a discussion of the circuit 
split surrounding the appropriate application of Rule 9(b) to FCA claims and 
how the circuit split has dramatically shifted over the last year. 
A.  The False Claims Act 
The FCA provides a civil remedy against “any person” who “knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval” by the U.S. government.34  Enacted during the Civil War in 1863, 
the FCA was created to put an end to the selling of defective goods35 to the 
military, as well as to fight schemes used to defraud the government.36  Due 
to the difficulty of even detecting such fraudulent activity, Congress included 
a qui tam37 provision in the FCA, designed to encourage private individuals – 
known as “relators” – to come forward with information about potential fraud 
by bringing claims under the FCA on behalf of the federal government.38  If 
the claim was successful, the relator received a portion of the government’s 
recovered damages.39 
In 1986, Congress made significant amendments to the FCA for the 
purpose of bolstering its power to combat fraud against the government.40  In 
addition to increasing the penalty by $5000 to $10,000 per violation of the 
FCA, the amendments provide additional incentives to relators with the ex-
plicit purpose of promoting qui tam litigation.41  These incentives include a 
 
 33. Id. at 917–18 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 
180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
 34. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 35. Defective goods were routinely sold to the military during the Civil War, 
including for example, artillery shells filled with sawdust instead of gunpowder.  J. 
Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legisla-
tion, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Qui tam is derived “from a longer Latin phrase, ‘qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur,’ which means ‘[w]ho sues on behalf of the 
King as well as for himself.’”  Id. at 541 n.3 (2000) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990)).  This provision was based on the idea that it is 
easier to incentivize “a rogue to catch a rogue.”  Id. at 556 n.64. 
 38. Id. at 541. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 561–62. 
 41. Id. 
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guarantee to relators of all costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees and as much as 
thirty percent of the total recovery.42 
Today, the FCA remains the government’s primary tool for fighting 
false claims for funds under government contracts, including Medicare, de-
fense contracts, federally-insured loans and mortgages, and veterans’ bene-
fits.43  For fiscal year 2014, the Department of Justice reported a record $5.69 
billion in settlements and judgments from civil fraud and false claims cases.44  
Whistleblowers’ qui tam suits were responsible for nearly $3 billion of the 
total $5.69 billion recovered, and whistleblowers received a combined $435 
million in rewards.45  Of the $5.69 billion recovered in 2014, false claims 
against federally funded healthcare programs, including Medicare and Medi-
caid, constituted $2.3 billion.46 
Following the FCA’s 1986 amendments, the number of qui tam suits has 
substantially increased each year.47  In 1987, for instance, a mere thirty qui 
tam suits were filed, but from 2000 to 2008, between 300 and 400 suits were 
filed annually.48  Most recently, in 2013 and 2014, over 700 qui tam suits 
were filed per year.49  This rapid increase in the number of qui tam suits filed 
each year illustrates the growing importance of consistently applying Rule 
9(b) to such claims.  Unfortunately, however, the courts’ varying applications 
of Rule 9(b) are anything but consistent and instead, have created a deep cir-
cuit split. 
B.  The Circuit Split on the Pleading Standard for FCA Claims 
Because the FCA is an anti-fraud statute, federal appellate courts have 
long agreed that Rule 9(b) applies to all complaints brought under the FCA.50  
Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to “state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud,” a higher pleading standard than what is required of plain-
tiffs who allege non-fraud claims.51  Courts repeatedly articulate two main 
 
 42. Id. at 562. 
 43. See Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion From False Claims Act 
Cases in Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 5. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 
1309–10 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of 
Am., 198 F.R.D. 560, 562 (N.D. Ga. 2000)) (affirming the district court’s assertion 
that Rule 9(b)’s application to FCA claims is “well settled” and “self evident”). 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  In contrast to Rule 9(b), Rule 8(a) merely requires 
plaintiffs who plead non-fraud claims to provide “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” such that the claim “is plausible on 
its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (citing FED. R. CIV. 
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purposes for Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard: (1) to protect the defendant 
from baseless claims and (2) to provide adequate notice to the defendant of 
the plaintiff’s claims so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to defend.52   
Although appellate courts agree that Rule 9(b) applies to FCA claims, 
they are sharply divided as to the manner in which Rule 9(b) applies.53  Un-
fortunately for relators, the act of filing a false claim is the principal element 
in an FCA action, and yet, many relators lack specific information about 
whether a false claim was actually filed, unless of course, the relator has ac-
cess to the defendant’s accounting or billing department.54  To complicate 
this inconsistency among circuit courts, the relator’s failure to satisfy Rule 
9(b) is generally a defendant’s first defense against an FCA action. 
Prior to June 2014, a total of eight courts of appeals were evenly split on 
the proper application of Rule 9(b) to qui tam FCA claims.55  The First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits followed what has been deemed a “relaxed con-
struction”56 to Rule 9(b), holding that an FCA complaint may plead “particu-
lar details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that 
lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted” and still satis-
fy Rule 9(b).57  Meanwhile, the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
followed a stricter approach to Rule 9(b), holding that an FCA complaint 
must identify “an actual false claim with particularity.”58  In March 2014, the 
Supreme Court of the United States declined an opportunity to resolve the 
split by denying certiorari to United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharma-
ceuticals North America, Inc.59 
Since the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, two recently decided cir-
cuit cases have tipped the scales in favor of the relaxed approach to Rule 9(b) 
while deepening the current split.60  In June 2014, the Third Circuit addressed 
the Rule 9(b) issue, as a matter of first impression, in Foglia v. Renal Ven-
 
P. 8(a)).  Rule 8(a) does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics.”  Id. at 
570. 
 52. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 
F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 53. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda 
Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 134 U.S. 1759 (2014) (No.12-1349), 2013 WL 1945156, at *15. 
 54. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012); Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1311 (“The submission 
of a claim is . . . the sine qua non of a False Claims Act violation.”). 
 55. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 53, at *15. 
 56. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 
457–58 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 U.S. 1759 (2014). 
 57. United States ex. rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
 58. United States ex. rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
 59. 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014). 
 60. See United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 
F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014); Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
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tures Management, LLC.61  In Foglia, the court articulated the relaxed stand-
ard already followed by the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits: a com-
plaint may plead “particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired 
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 
submitted.”62  A mere two months later, in United States ex rel. Thayer v. 
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, the Eighth Circuit was given an oppor-
tunity to affirm its previous strict approach to Rule 9(b), as articulated in 
United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital, or to follow the Third Cir-
cuit in adopting a more relaxed approach to Rule 9(b).63 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that a relator who brings a qui tam action under the FCA may satisfy 
Rule 9(b)’s requirement to plead fraud with particularity without pleading 
representative examples of false claims.64  In so holding, the court distin-
guished United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital from the present 
case and revised its previously strict interpretation of Rule 9(b)’s application 
to FCA claims.65  The Eighth Circuit considered various factors in its deci-
sion to depart from its past approach to Rule 9(b): the important distinctions 
between the relator in Joshi and the relator, Thayer;66 the relationship be-
tween Rule 9(b) and the FCA’s success in achieving its purpose;67 and Rule 
9(b)’s purpose of protecting defendants from baseless claims.68 
The court began its opinion by reviewing Joshi’s description of the 
proper pleading standard under the FCA.69  The court explained its holding in 
Joshi, which required that a complaint specifically identify the “‘who, what, 
where, when, and how’ of the alleged fraud” in order to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 
particularity requirement.70  At the same time, the court emphasized that the 
Joshi opinion also stated that, if the relator alleged that the defendant had 
engaged in a systematic practice or “scheme” of submitting fraudulent claims, 
then the relator was not required to plead the “specific details of every alleged 
fraudulent claim,” so long as the relator provided some “representative exam-
ples” of the fraudulent conduct, including the time, place, and content of the 
fraudulent claims and the actors’ identities.71 
 
 61. 754 F.3d 153. 
 62. Id. at 155–56 (quoting Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190). 
 63. See Thayer, 765 F.3d at 916–19. 
 64. Id. at 918. 
 65. Id. at 917. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 918. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 916–17. 
 70. Id. at 917 (quoting United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 441 F.3d 
552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 71. Id. (quoting Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557). 
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Here, the court turned to Thayer’s argument: that although she did not 
provide any representative examples of the false claims in her complaint, 
neither Rule 9(b) nor Joshi required that representative examples be set forth 
in every FCA complaint that alleged a scheme of fraudulent claims.72  Agree-
ing with Thayer’s position, the court held that the representative-examples 
requirement articulated in Joshi did not need to be satisfied with respect to 
some portions of Thayer’s complaint.73 
The court went on to distinguish the Joshi complaint from Thayer’s 
complaint.74  The court emphasized that, unlike Dr. Joshi, who had no con-
nection to the defendant hospital’s billing or claims department and could 
only speculate as to the false claims being submitted, Thayer’s role as center 
manager for two Planned Parenthood clinics meant that she oversaw Planned 
Parenthood’s billing and claims systems.75  As a result, she was able to plead 
personal, first-hand knowledge of Planned Parenthood’s false claims.76  As 
such, the court concluded, the relaxed approach used by other circuits – that a 
relator can satisfy Rule 9(b) by pleading both particular details of a scheme to 
submit false claims and by having “reliable indicia that lead to a strong infer-
ence that claims were actually submitted” – was sufficient in Thayer’s partic-
ular circumstances.77 
To buttress this conclusion, the court went on to reason that Rule 9(b) 
should remain “context specific and flexible” so that the Rule will not hinder 
legitimate efforts to expose fraud under the FCA.78  The court also considered 
Rule 9(b)’s purpose: to “protect[] defendants from baseless claims.”79  The 
court reasoned that because a relator who lacks sufficient indicia of reliability 
is more likely to have unfounded allegations, this type of relator must plead 
representative examples of the alleged false claims to protect the defendant 
from unfounded claims.80  In contrast, a relator like Thayer has sufficient 
indicia of reliability, such as by pleading personal knowledge of the defend-
ant’s billing practices and false claims submissions.81  Thus, relators like 
Thayer can support their fraud allegations without providing representative 
examples, thereby still satisfying Rule 9(b)’s objective of protecting defend-
ants against unfounded claims.82  Concluding its clarification of the pleading 
standard, the court noted that, to satisfy the “particular details” requirement of 
its holding, the relator still needed to provide enough detail “to enable the 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 
(5th Cir. 2009)). 
 78. Id. at 918 (quoting Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 918–19. 
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defendant to respond specifically and quickly to the potentially damaging 
allegations.”83 
Finally, the court applied this revised pleading standard to the allega-
tions in Thayer’s complaint.84  The court found that Thayer sufficiently pled 
four particular schemes by alleging particular details, such as the names of 
those who instructed her to carry out the schemes, the two-year time period, 
the particular clinics that participated in the schemes, and the methods used to 
carry out the schemes.85  Due to Thayer’s position as center manager, her 
access to Planned Parenthood’s centralized billing system, and her personal 
knowledge of Planned Parenthood’s false claims submissions, the court de-
termined that Thayer’s claims had sufficient indicia of reliability, satisfying 
Rule 9(b).86  As a result, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dis-
missal of these four allegations, which included that Planned Parenthood filed 
fraudulent claims for: 
(1) unnecessary quantities of birth control pills, (2) birth control pills 
dispensed without examinations or without or prior to a physician’s 
order, (3) abortion-related services, and (4) the full amount of services 
that had already been paid, in whole or in part, by “donations” . . . 
from patients.87    
The court found that Thayer did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity re-
quirement, however, in two of her allegations: that Planned Parenthood vio-
lated the FCA by upcoding and “by causing other hospitals to unknowingly 
submit claims for abortion-related services.”88  The court held that Thayer 
failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) in her upcoding allegation because she did not 
plead the specific details of the scheme to submit false claims through upcod-
ing.89  Specifically, the court noted that Thayer made conclusory and general-
ized upcoding allegations without alleging when or how often the upcoding 
took place at various clinics, who or how many physicians participated in the 
upcoding, or what types of services were upcoded.90  As to the second allega-
tion concerning misleading hospitals into submitting claims for abortion-
related services, the court determined that this claim lacked sufficient indicia 
of reliability because Thayer did not allege that she had personal knowledge 
of the other hospitals’ billing practices nor that she had access to their billing 
systems.91  As such, the court concluded, Thayer could merely speculate as to 
 
 83. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 
(8th Cir. 2003)). 
 84. Id. at 919. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 920. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 919–20. 
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the false claims submitted by the unidentified hospitals.92  For these reasons, 
the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the previous two allega-
tions.93 
V.  COMMENT 
When the Eighth Circuit relaxed its 9(b) pleading standard for FCA 
claims in Thayer, the Eighth Circuit appeared to be joining the majority of 
circuits in the trend toward a uniform application of a more relaxed 9(b) 
pleading standard.94  Upon further examination, however, the Eighth Circuit 
appears to have only further contributed to the confusion among the relaxed 
standard circuits, suggesting an even greater need for Supreme Court resolu-
tion of the circuit split.  First, this Part articulates the divergent nuances and 
understandings of the relaxed interpretation of Rule 9(b) present in different 
circuits, as well as the reasons why the Supreme Court should resolve the 
circuit split.  Next, this Part addresses Thayer’s more immediate implications 
for Missouri businesses that contract with the government.  
A.  Uniform in Label Only: The Relaxed 9(b) Standard as a Confused 
9(b) Standard 
At first glance, the circuit split over how to apply Rule 9(b) to FCA 
claims appears to be on the verge of resolving itself.  With the Third and 
Eighth Circuits recently adopting the relaxed pleading standard, the majority 
of circuits95 are now following the relaxed standard with only three circuits 
still following the strict pleading standard.96  In fact, the Solicitor General has 
voiced his belief that appellate courts are trending toward a uniform relaxed 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 920. 
 94. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 95. At present, seven circuits are classified as following the “relaxed” interpreta-
tion of Rule 9(b) when applied to FCA claims: the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  See United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., 
L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 U.S. 3454 (2010); United 
States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 156–57 (3d Cir. 
2014); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 2009); 
United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 
2009); Thayer, 765 F.3d at 918; United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 
993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010); United States ex. rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, 
Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 96. At present, three circuits are classified as following the “strict” interpretation 
of Rule 9(b) when applied to FCA claims: the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.  
See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 456–
57 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 U.S. 1759 (2014); Sanderson v. HCA-The 
Healthcare Co., 447 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Clausen v. 
Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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standard so that the circuit split “may be capable of resolution without [the 
Supreme Court’s] intervention.”97  On closer examination, however, what 
appears to be a trend toward a uniform relaxed standard is not so uniform 
after all.  Rather than being consistent, the relaxed standard is a muddied, 
divergent standard with applications that vary drastically between circuits; 
each circuit applies its own set of nuances and interpretations about which 
particular circumstances allow for the relaxed pleading standard to satisfy 
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.  
For instance, the Fourth Circuit cannot properly be classified within ei-
ther the strict standard or relaxed standard camps.  With its 2013 decision in 
United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., 
the Fourth Circuit adopted its own approach – one that falls somewhere in 
between the relaxed construction and strict construction of Rule 9(b).98   On 
the one hand, the Fourth Circuit specifically voiced its disagreement with the 
“more relaxed construction of Rule 9(b),” holding that “when a defendant’s 
actions, as alleged and as reasonably inferred from the allegations, could have 
led, but need not necessarily have led, to the submission of false claims, a 
relator must allege with particularity that specific false claims actually were 
presented to the government for payment.”99  At the same time, the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the alternative strict construction of Rule 9(b) that the relator 
must always plead presentment with particularity.100  Instead, the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s intermediate approach only requires the relator to plead presentment 
with particularity in cases where there is some doubt of presentment.101  In 
other words, the Fourth Circuit’s holding can be read as allowing a qui tam 
complaint to plead a lesser standard of particularity if the complaint pled alle-
gations sufficient to leave no doubt that the defendant actually submitted the 
false claims, but in all other cases as requiring a qui tam complaint to plead 
presentment with particularity.102  As such, the Fourth Circuit’s approach is in 
a class all its own. 
Meanwhile, circuits classified in the relaxed standard camp have very 
different interpretations of which circumstances are appropriate for the re-
laxed standard’s application.  For example, the First Circuit has only relaxed 
its particularity standard for complaints alleging that the defendant induced 
third parties to file false claims, rather than alleging that the defendant filed 
 
 97. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, United States ex rel. Nathan v. 
Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (No. 12-1349), 2014 WL 
709660, at *10–11. 
 98. 707 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759.  In Takeda, 
a sales manager for Takeda Pharmaceuticals brought a qui tam action alleging that 
Takeda used a scheme to market its products for “off-label” uses, and the resulting 
claims for the products were then reimbursed by Medicaid and Medicare, constituting 
false claims.  Id. at 453. 
 99. Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
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the false claims itself.103  Further, the First Circuit explicitly limited its appli-
cation of the relaxed standard to the particular facts at hand, specifically 
“‘declin[ing] to draft a litigation manual full of scenarios’ of what allegations 
would be sufficient for purposes of Rule 9(b).”104  More recently, in United 
States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharma. Co., Ltd., the First Circuit reaffirmed its 
stance, noting that the relaxed pleading standard would only be permitted in 
cases where the complaint alleges that the defendant induced third parties to 
file false claims with the government.105  This distinction between first-party 
and third-party false claims represents only one of many divergent nuances 
among circuits regarding the appropriate application of the relaxed 9(b) 
standard.  In sharp contrast to the First Circuit, other circuits classified in the 
relaxed camp do not restrict the relaxed pleading standard’s application to 
cases in which the defendant induced third parties to file false claims.106 
 
 103. United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 
(1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Unit-
ed States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 733 (1st Cir. 2007), overruling 
recognized by United States ex rel. Wilson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Inc., 750 F.3d 
111, 113 (1st Cir. 2014)) (noting the “distinction between a qui tam action alleging 
that the defendant made false claims to the government, and a qui tam action in which 
the defendant induced third parties to file false claims with the government” and also 
noting that only in the third party-type of qui tam action can a relator “satisfy Rule 
9(b) by providing ‘factual or statistical evidence to strengthen the inference of fraud 
beyond possibility’ without necessarily providing details as to each false claim”). 
 104. Id. at 31–32 (quoting United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 
F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990)) (holding that relator pharmaceutical salesman’s qui tam 
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) by doing more than merely suggesting that fraud was 
possible, but by also setting forth allegations of kickbacks that resulted in the submis-
sion of false claims by eight specified healthcare providers, the dates and amounts of 
the false claims filed with the Medicare program by each provider, and the number of 
claims filed for one month by one particular hospital). 
 105. United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 116, 123–24 
(1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 53 (2014). 
 106. There are examples of cases in which the “relaxed” standard was applied to 
claims of first-party presentment, rather than being restricted to claims of third-party 
presentment.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 
191–92 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that relator’s complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) as to the 
individual doctor defendant’s first-party false claims, despite not pleading the exact 
contents of the alleged false claims submitted to the government); United States ex 
rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that relator’s complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) as to the defendant waste man-
agement company’s first-party false claims, despite not pleading “the actual present-
ment of a false claim for payment”); United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce 
Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that relator’s complaint satisfied 
Rule 9(b) as to the defendant engine manufacturer’s first-party false claims, despite 
not pleading the actual “invoices and representations that Rolls-Royce submitted to its 
[government] customers”); United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 
LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that relator’s complaint satisfied 
Rule 9(b) as to the defendant healthcare provider’s first-party false claims, despite not 
13
Specker: The Plight of the Tattletale
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1252 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
The factual circumstances under which the relaxed standard is permitted 
also vary among circuits, and whether the relaxed standard is deemed suffi-
cient for Rule 9(b) purposes appears to sometimes depend on the relator’s 
level of access to the billing department and the actual false claims.107  Some 
circuits specifically note that the relator’s lack of access to the necessary bill-
ing records needed to satisfy the presentment element of Rule 9(b) further 
supports allowing a relaxed standard so that relators can use other means to 
prove presentment, besides alleging the specific contents of a representative 
false claim that they cannot access in the first place.108  In contrast, the Eighth 
Circuit found the very existence of the relator’s personal access to defend-
ant’s billing department and records to be persuasive in finding that the rela-
tor satisfied Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements without alleging a specific 
false claim because the relator’s access to the billing department constituted 
sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the relaxed pleading standard.109 
Interestingly, in contrast to the Third and Seventh Circuits giving a pass 
to relators because they lacked access to the defendant organization’s billing 
practices, the Eighth Circuit seemingly gave a pass to Thayer because she had 
so much access to and knowledge of the defendant organization’s billing 
practices.110  Thayer’s increased first-hand knowledge should arguably in-
crease, rather than decrease, the level of specificity required of her to satisfy 
Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard. 
These are only a few of the inconsistencies present among circuit courts 
deemed to be following the same relaxed pleading standard for purposes of 
Rule 9(b).  The dramatic variance between circuits’ applications of this re-
laxed standard suggests that it is even more unlikely that the circuit split will 
resolve itself.  Instead, only the Supreme Court’s review can ensure that the 
Rule 9(b) pleading standard is uniformly applied to qui tam cases, regardless 
of where the qui tam cases are filed. 
 
pleading presentment of the actual false claims submitted to the government); United 
States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 F.3d 914, 918 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that relator’s complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) as to some of the de-
fendant healthcare provider’s first-party false claims, despite not pleading “repre-
sentative examples” of actual false claims). 
 107. See, e.g., Foglia, LLC, 754 F.3d at 158. 
 108. There are examples of cases in which the court found the relator’s lack of 
access to be persuasive in allowing a relaxed pleading standard of presentment.  See, 
e.g., id. (“This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Renal, and only Renal, 
has access to the documents that could easily prove the claim one way or another—
the full billing records from the time under consideration.”); Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854 
(reversing the district court’s ruling that because the relator did not have at least one 
of defendant’s billing packages, the relator failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement, and noting, instead, that because “a relator is unlikely to have those 
documents unless he works in the defendant’s accounting department, the district 
court’s ruling takes a big bite out of qui tam litigation” and was incorrect). 
 109. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 918. 
 110. Compare Foglia, 754 F.3d at 158, and Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854, with Thayer, 
765 F.3d at 918. 
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The inconsistent application of the relaxed pleading standard among cir-
cuits is only one of many reasons why the Supreme Court should resolve the 
circuit split.  In addition, the critical importance of this area of law also 
weighs in favor of Supreme Court review.111  First, the FCA continues to be 
the government’s primary mechanism for fighting fraud.112  The dramatic 
recoveries obtained by the federal government in qui tam suits further indi-
cate the importance of this area of law to the government’s continuing ability 
to combat fraud.113  At present, geographically where an FCA claim is filed 
could be the determining factor in whether the government survives a motion 
to dismiss its FCA claims.  For instance, in a circuit that follows the strict 
pleading standard, the government’s case will be dismissed if the relator has 
detailed knowledge of a fraudulent scheme but lacks “independent access to 
records such as prescription invoices” or where the relator lacks access to 
obtaining the requisite documents because “privacy laws . . . pose a barrier to 
obtaining such information without court involvement.”114  Furthermore, the 
number of filed qui tam suits has increased considerably with each year since 
1987, suggesting that the FCA will only continue to grow in importance in 
the future.115 
In addition to the importance of the FCA’s uniform and predictable ap-
plication to the government’s ability to combat fraud, the deepening circuit 
split on how to apply Rule 9(b) to FCA claims constitutes a central issue in 
qui tam litigation, not to mention an issue that arises repeatedly and frequent-
ly.116  The importance of resolving Rule 9(b)’s proper application to FCA 
claims should come as no surprise; as the Fifth Circuit noted, “Rule 9(b) has 
long played [an important] screening function, standing as a gatekeeper to 
discovery, a tool to weed out meritless fraud claims sooner [rather] than lat-
er.”117  Furthermore, the presentment of a false claim element has long been 
deemed the sine qua non of a FCA violation, “without which ‘there is simply 
no actionable damage to the public fisc.’”118  As such, Rule 9(b) is the first 
 
 111. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 112. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 113. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 114. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 
458 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014).  The Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”) is one example of a privacy law 
that would constitute an obstacle to a relator’s ability to obtain specific false claims 
billing or prescription records to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements.  Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 115. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 116. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heart-
land, 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014) (suggesting the frequent and repeated nature of 
how to properly apply Rule 9(b) to FCA claims). 
 117. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185–86 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
 118. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 
F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
15
Specker: The Plight of the Tattletale
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1254 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
line of defense for defendant organizations, making the uniform application 
of Rule 9(b) imperative and warranting of Supreme Court review. 
B.  Thayer’s Immediate Implications for Missouri Businesses That 
Contract with the Government 
Until the Supreme Court takes up the circuit split on how to apply Rule 
9(b)’s pleading standard to FCA claims, Thayer will remain the law for the 
Eighth Circuit.  As such, it is important to address Thayer’s more immediate 
implications for Missouri businesses that contract with the government.119  
Although the Eighth Circuit relaxed Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard in Thayer, 
the Eighth Circuit certainly did not eliminate it.120  Thus, alarmed defense 
attorneys’ allegations that Thayer serves to “erode[] fundamental procedural 
protections guaranteed to FCA defendants” are somewhat exaggerated.121  
For instance, to satisfy Rule 9(b) without pleading representative examples of 
false claims, the Eighth Circuit held that the relator still must plead sufficient 
“particular details” of a scheme “to enable the defendant to respond specifi-
cally and quickly to the potentially damaging allegations.”122 
In its analysis of whether Thayer satisfied this pleading standard, the 
Eighth Circuit emphasized the importance of the reliability of the relator’s 
allegations.123  Here, the Eighth Circuit found that the reliability of Thayer’s 
allegations was supported by her pleading of the “bases” for her personal 
knowledge of the fraudulent claims – mainly, her position as center manager, 
which gave her access to Planned Parenthood’s centralized billing system and 
billing practices.124  Thayer’s bases of personal knowledge paired with the 
particular details125 of the alleged scheme were held to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s 
 
 119. These implications, of course, also apply to businesses in the other states 
comprised by the Eighth Circuit: Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dako-
ta, and South Dakota.  See Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts of 
Appeals and United States District Courts, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/map.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
 120. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 918–19. 
 121. See, e.g., Jacques Smith et al., Eighth Circuit Joins Handful of Federal 
Courts of Appeals to Erode Important Defendant Protections in False Claims Act 
Actions, HEALTH CARE COUNSEL BLOG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://healthcarecounsel
blog.com/articles/eighth-circuit-joins-handful-federal-courts-appeals-erode-
important-defendant-protections. 
 122. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 918–19 (quoting United States ex rel. Costner v. United 
States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 919. 
 125. The “particular details” alleged in Thayer’s complaint included the names of 
individuals who instructed her to carry it out, the time period during which the 
schemes occurred, the specific clinics that participated in the schemes, and the partic-
ular methods by which the schemes were conducted.  Id. 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 20
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/20
2015] THE PLIGHT OF THE TATTLETALE 1255 
particularity requirement.126  In contrast to the reliability of Thayer’s allega-
tions that Planned Parenthood had directly submitted false claims, the Eighth 
Circuit found Thayer’s allegations that Planned Parenthood had induced third 
parties to submit false claims127 to be too unreliable to satisfy Rule 9(b) be-
cause Thayer lacked direct knowledge of the hospitals’ billed claims.128  
Finding that these particular claims were mere speculation and lacked the 
requisite “indicia of reliability,” the court dismissed these particular claims.129 
Although the Eighth Circuit did relax the pleading standard, it still re-
quires relators to satisfactorily plead their claims with both sufficient detail 
and reliability,130 and thus, it is unlikely that the Thayer decision should cause 
the level of alarm for Missouri businesses that has been enunciated by de-
fense attorneys.131  With that said, the relaxing of the standard will allow 
more qui tam claims to survive a motion to dismiss, and logically, this could 
result in an increase in the number of qui tam suits that are filed in the Eighth 
Circuit and that survive early dismissal.  In addition, the novelty of the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision, as well as the previously discussed confusion among the 
circuits about Rule 9(b), lends itself to increased unpredictability for Missouri 
businesses defending against False Claims actions.  What constitutes “reliable 
indicia” sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b) will remain a grey area to be sorted out 
by future courts.  Finally, as with any relaxing of standards, Thayer means 
increased liability exposure for Missouri businesses.  Because a whistleblow-
er is no longer required to provide the specific contents of a fraudulent bill 
actually submitted to the government, the standard that whistleblowers must 
meet to make it to trial is significantly lower, and more whistleblowers, as 
well as the federal government, will likely be further empowered to bring 
more actions under the FCA. 
Although defendant businesses’ first line of defense – a motion to dis-
miss for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b) – was weakened by Thayer, businesses 
should take heart in the fact that this line of defense still exists: a portion of 
Thayer’s claims did not survive Planned Parenthood’s motion to dismiss, 
despite the relaxed standard, because those claims still failed to satisfy Rule 
9(b)’s particularity requirements.132  Thus, until the Supreme Court resolves 
the circuit split, Missouri businesses should carefully re-evaluate their billing 
practices and dealings with the government in light of the fact that, post-
Thayer, they conduct their business in a jurisdiction that is seemingly more 
sympathetic to FCA claims brought by relators and the government than it is 
to businesses attempting to defend against such claims. 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. For instance, Thayer claimed that hospitals allegedly submitted false claims 
for abortion-related services without knowing that they were abortion-related ser-
vices.  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 919–20. 
 130. Id. at 918–19. 
 131. See, e.g., Jacques Smith et al., supra note 121. 
 132. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 919–20. 
17
Specker: The Plight of the Tattletale
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1256 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Thayer illustrates the inherent confusion surrounding Rule 9(b)’s appli-
cation to FCA claims and, as discussed, serves to only further contribute to 
this confusion.  Although some, like the Solicitor General, may believe that 
the circuits are trending toward a uniform standard like that adopted in 
Thayer, closer examination of the relaxed 9(b) approaches employed in these 
circuits reveals their total lack of consistency and uniformity.  Showing no 
signs of resolving itself, this circuit confusion paired with the increasing im-
portance and relevance of the FCA comprises a strong argument for Supreme 
Court review. 
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court takes up this circuit split in 
the future, the Eighth Circuit, as well as other circuits, will be left with no 
other choice than to continue finessing their own unique approaches to Rule 
9(b), deepening the current circuit split and the divergent patchwork of stand-
ards between circuits.  As for businesses that receive government funds, busi-
nesses residing in the Eighth Circuit can be sure that they will have a more 
difficult time defending against FCA claims and, perhaps, can expect an in-
crease in the number of FCA claims filed. 
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